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Writer's picture@ Cynthia Adina Kirkwood

Portugal's Assembly to Mark Contentious 1975 Failed Coup

Updated: Nov 28

The first of more than 30 "flash" messages which U.S. Ambassador Frank Carlucci sent back to Washington, D.C. on the November 25, 1975 coup attempt by leftist paratroopers, according to the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon. (Photo from U.S. Embassy in Lisbon website)

 

There was a failed military coup in Portugal on November 25, 1975. That much has not been contested by any political party or country. However, the actors in the attempted coup and the significance of the day's events are still in dispute 49 years later.


Therefore, when the Assembleia da República, or the legislature, holds the first sessão solene on Monday, November 25, commemorating the events of November 25, 1975, attendance will be split along party lines.


"The factors that led to the 25th of November are many, but it is an anarchic combination of events and provocations that led to the outcome that, almost 50 years later, each side of the barricade interprets in its own way," according to A Vitória da Esquerda Contra a Esquerda que a Direita Celebra (The Victory of the Left Against the Left That the Right Celebrates), Expresso (November 22).


The country was on the verge of civil war a year and a half after the Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974, a military coup that ended nearly 50 years of the autocratic Estado Novo, reported SIC Notícias (November 25, 2023). Sharp disagreement about the political and ideological direction of the country caused turmoil.


The Carnation Revolution was immediately followed by the release of political prisoners, the dismantling of the political police force, the occupation of government buildings and mass strikes by students, civil servants, military personnel and farm workers. Hundreds of organisations were set up to represent workers and students, according to Nigel Trench, the British Ambassador in Lisbon, in The British Labour Government and Portugal in the Aftermath of the Carnation Revolution (April 25), The British Historical Society of Portugal.


"The resulting power vacuum led to an explosion of popular feeling, which turned a military coup into a grassroots revolutionary movement that was spiralling out of the control of both the Communists and the Socialists. Ambassador Trench was concerned by (António de) Spínola’s fall in September 1974 and the apparently unstoppable strikes and demonstrations that he thought were plunging Portugal into 'conditions very close to anarchy'.


After the Verão Quente (Hot Summer) of 1975, "with power in the streets and indiscipline in the Armed Forces", a coup psychosis was sweeping the country. There was going to be a coup, but no one knew when or who would be the one to initiate it: leftists, communists, the far right or moderates," according to A Vitória da Esquerda Contra a Esquerda que a Direita Celebra (The Victory of the Left Against the Left That the Right Celebrates), (Expresso) (November 22).


Legislature's Working Group


The Assembly's decision to create a November 25 working group was made on September 25, as there was no consensus on the format of the session, reported Expresso (October 9). The Partido Social Democrata (PSD) and Partido Socialista (PS), which are the two leading parties, Chega, Inciativa Liberal (IL) and Partido Popular (CDS) named representatives to the working group. Bloco de Esquerda (BE), Livre and Pessoas-Animais-Natureza (PAN) also nominated members.


However, the left-wing Bloco de Esquerda plans to have only one out of five deputies present at the commemoration, reported SIC Notícias (November 23). Yet, even its partial participation has been accused of minimizing the reactionary nature of the debate, reported Observador (November 23).


The Partido Communista Portugues (PCP), which chose not to participate in the working group, will not attend the commemoration, said its secretary-general, Paulo Raimundo, according to Expresso (November 19).


The PCP insists that the initiative devalues the 25th of April and constitutes a provocation, following the 50th anniversary of the Carnation Revolution.


Expresso (October 9) wrote: "It should be remembered that the entire left voted against the CDS proposal to commemorate 25 November 1975 every year in Parliament -- only PAN (which won its first seat in 2015), abstained. PSD, CDS, Chega (which won its first seat in 2019), and IL (which won its first seat in 2019) voted in favor. At the time, the liberals' proposal to include the "celebration of 25 November in the commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary of 25 April" also led to criticism from the left with the parties arguing that the two dates could not be compared."

The Portuguese Communist View


Avante!, the central organ of the PCP, offered its view of November 25:


"The 25th of November, contrary to what many of its protagonists said, wrote and some continue to insinuate, was not a coup promoted by the PCP, the Military Left or the so-called 'Gonçalvista wing' (Vasco Gonçalvo was prime minister of the government furthest to the left in 1974 and 1975) of the MFA (Armed Forces Movement).


"It was, rather, a counter-revolutionary military coup, the result of careful and long preparation, within the framework of a tumultous process of rearrangement of forces on the political and military plane, with the support and involvement of the USA, in particular Frank Carlucci, then ambassador of Portugal, of social democracy and of conservative sectors of the Catholic Church.


"Very diverse forces participated in its preparation, associated in a complex process of contradictory alliances, as Álvaro Cunhal highlights (in The Truth and the Lie in the April Revolution):


"' In the great counter-revolutionary alliance, internally very fragmented, declared fascists and other radical reactionaries participated, who aimed to establish a new dictatorship, which would take violent repressive measures, namely the illegalization and destruction of the PCP.'


"Mário Soares and the PS played an important role in the political preparation for the 25th of November."

 

U.S. Ambassador Frank Carlucci met frequently with Mário Soares, who was first the Socialist Party (PS) leader, then Foreign Minister and, finally, Prime Minister in the tiny 'Crow's Nest' of the Ambassador's residence. Reports such as the one above, now declassified, depict frank exchanges between the two men. Such conversations gave Carlucci confidence that Portugal would not "fall" to Communism and that the United States should embrace, not alienate, socialists like Mário Soares, according to the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon. (Photo from U.S. Embassy in Lisbon website)

 

The United States View


The U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Portugal offered a different view of November 25 in an exhibit at Casa Carlucci, which includes formerly declassified documents:


"Washington leadership worried pro-Communist forces might prevail after Portugal’s Carnation Revolution of April 1974. But after his arrival in January 1975, U.S. Ambassador Frank Carlucci grew confident that the Portuguese people would vote to remain anchored in Europe, NATO, and the transatlantic alliance.


"Even after pro-democracy parties dominated the April 1975 Constituent Assembly elections, Washington still doubted Portugal would steer toward democracy.  During the Verão Quente (Hot Summer) of 1975, Frank Carlucci and Mário Soares met frequently in this tiny room – then a laundry room with a view — to exchange ideas and ensure the Carnation Revolution would not usher in a new dictatorship.


"By August 1975 Carlucci had persuaded U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to back Portugal’s democratic leadership.


"The Communist coup attempt in Portugal was defeated on November 25, 1975.


"By the time Mário Soares visited Washington in January 1976, Kissinger had been convinced to support Portugal in its constitutional transition. In July 1976 Portugal secured its democratic future in its first constitutional government with Soares at its head. Carlucci advanced economic and military support to stabilize Portugal’s finances and armed forces."

 

The Role of the British Government


The role that British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's Labor government played in Portugal in the 17 months after the Carnation Revolution is put forward in The British Labour Government and Portugal in the Aftermath of the Carnation Revolution:


"FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) officials grew deeply concerned by the appointment of Communist ministers in Lisbon. The U.S. shared the same concerns, telling London that it saw the situation as 'proof of a shift towards the left in European politics, which could lead to neutralism'. According to British Intelligence, this could lead to Portugal’s exit from NATO, which would have a negative 'psychological effect' on an alliance whose southern flank was already militarily weak. It could also have a ‘contagious’ effect on other countries where there was growing anti-NATO sentiment. These dangers led the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to point out that a non-aligned government (even a democratic one) was less compatible with NATO’s aims than the right-wing dictatorship had been.


"Unlike other NATO members, the British government reacted calmly to the growing grip of the Communist left on the process of political change in Portugal. British officials considered 'the situation was confused and murky', but that 'it would be ill-advised and counterproductive to consider Portugal a lost cause'.


"It was argued that, in view of the collapse of the Portuguese economy, a severing of ties between that country and the Free World would be exploited by the Soviet Union to provide financial aid and increase its presence in Lisbon. British diplomacy considered that the economic chaos in which Portugal was immersed made economic aid an effective means of persuasion to steer the course of the revolution. If the chance existed to establish democracy in Portugal, then it was worth responding positively to the Portuguese authorities’ requests for economic assistance, even though the government included Communists, as collaboration with Lisbon would increase Britain’s ability to influence the decisions made by Portugal.


"Despite limited resources, the British thought that its economic and technical initiatives could act as a lever to the advantage of the pro-West groups that existed in the MFA (Armed Forces Movement). At the end of May 1975, (British Foreign Secretary James) Callaghan remarked to Kissinger and U.S. President Gerald Ford that the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) was 'a microcosm of all kinds of opinion and not beyond redemption'."


Then, the March 11, 1975 right-wing coup attempt led by (António de) Spínola, (the military officer who had been the first president of Portugal, May 1974 to September 1974, after the Carnation Revolution) failed, resulting in more political polarization.


"During the next few weeks, the Communist Party’s presence in the government grew, the banking system was nationalised, and one purge followed another. In response, Callaghan asked the BBC to increase broadcasts on its Portuguese service to compensate for the increasingly pro-Communist views of the Portuguese media."


Throughout the summer of 1975, the Western allies pursued a diplomatic effort toward Portugal.


"British Ambassador Nigel Trench was told to increase pressure on the prime minister to reduce the increasing communist influence in the government and the administration. During the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in August 1975, Wilson expressed his deep concerns about political trends in Portugal to (President Francisco da) Costa Gomes (the military officer who was the second president, September 1974 to July 1976, after the Carnation Revolution). Wilson also discussed Portugal with the Soviet premier, Leonid Brezhnev, expressing the West’s fear over possible Soviet support for a communist coup in Portugal. He even threatened a breakdown of the prevailing détente between the USSR and the West if the former backed Álvaro Cunhal’s Communist Party.


"After the CSCE, Wilson and the leaders of seven other European Social Democratic parties moved on to Stockholm, where they founded the Committee of Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy in Portugal. In addition to offering economic aid, the members committed themselves to visiting Portugal in support of the PS.


"While the British Labor Party focused on PS, the British government extended its support to the weak centre-right organisations, in particular the Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular (CDS), a conservative-leaning formation whose existence had been called into question after the fall of Spínola. In late January 1975, the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) told the U.S. that Wilson’s government 'had encouraged direct relations between British political parties and their Portuguese counterparts'.


"According to British Intelligence, it was doubtful whether the Russians would support 'a new Cuba'. Moscow was more interested in intervening in the decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique. Nevertheless, Portugal’s apparent drift towards communism rang alarm bells in Western capitals. The need to ward off this threat led the Western powers to support the counter-revolutionary movement that spread throughout the north of the country from August 1975. This anti-communist movement, which saw the active participation of sectors of the PS, the landowning class, the Catholic Church and the extreme-right wing, was one factor that tipped the balance in favor of the forces advocating western-style parliamentary democracy.


"During August and September 1975, known as the verão quente (hot summer), there was a genuine struggle for control in the streets of Portugal, bringing the country to the brink of civil war. At the end of July, Soares asked the British government and the Socialist International for “money and even weapons” in case civil war broke out.


"Finally, the anti-communist mobilisation unleashed in Portugal’s north brought about the fall of the Fifth Provisional Government at the end of August 1975. This facilitated the setting up of a new government, which was made up primarily of social democrats and centrists.


"Callaghan felt it essential to build on this change with a show of support for the new authorities. This led to the offering of economic aid to Portugal, but with the condition that there should be a halt to experiments with “direct democracy” that were incompatible with the liberal tradition. The British ambassadors in other European capitals asked their hosts to provide continued assistance to Portugal, and October 1975 was marked by the announcement of various multilateral and bilateral aid programmes. This support helped the moderate government to recover from the failed ultra-left-wing revolt of November 1975.


"Pluralist democracy was not the inevitable outcome of the turbulent events in Portugal in 1974–76. Indeed, its establishment would not have been possible without the intervention of several international players.


"The outcome was closely linked to the international context, which was witnessing a move away from the ideological principles upon which the Cold War had been founded. An example of this is that U.S. policy on Portugal was finally adopting the position of its European allies, implicitly accepting the ineffectiveness of Cold War solutions. The European model thus played an important role in achieving political restraint in Portugal, with the close links between the U.S.A. and the U.K. not enough to give the former control over the British government’s policy towards Portugal."


Ex-President Ramalho Eanes to Attend


Former President of the Republic Ramalho Eanes accepted the invitation of the President of the Assembly of the Republic, José Pedro Aguiar-Branco, and will be present at the commemoration on November 25, reported Correio da Manhã (November 20).


Ramalho Eanes was the operational commander during the 25th of November coup attempt. He rejects the stigmatization of the date, which he argues is a continuation of April 25, the "founding day" of democracy.


The President of the Assembly of the Republic said that "the freedom to be present or not is a virtue of democracy" and so he understands that the PCP will not attend and the BE will be represented by only one out of five deputies. Even so, Aguiar-Branco said that he hopes to see the PCP and BE at the commemoration of November 25 next year, reported SIC Notícias (November 23).


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